Arbitration Law Review
Volume 4 Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation

Article 34

7-1-2012

Just a Matter of Time: The Second Circuit Renders
Ancillary State Laws Inapplicable by Authorizing
Arbitrators to Decide Whether a Statute of
Limitations Caqn Bar Arbitration
Daivy P.E. Dambreville

Follow this and additional works at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/arbitrationlawreview
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons
Recommended Citation
Daivy P. Dambreville, Just a Matter of Time: The Second Circuit Renders Ancillary State Laws Inapplicable by Authorizing Arbitrators to
Decide Whether a Statute of Limitations Caqn Bar Arbitration, 4 307 (2012).

This Student Submission - Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn State Law eLibrary. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Arbitration Law Review by an authorized editor of Penn State Law eLibrary. For more information, please contact ram6023@psu.edu.

J UST A M ATTER OF T IME : T HE S ECOND C IRCUIT R ENDERS
A NCILLARY S TATE L AWS I NAPPLICABLE B Y A UTHORIZIN G
A RBITRATORS TO D ECIDE W HETHER A S TATUTE OF L IM ITATIONS
C AN B AR A RBITRATION
Daivy P. E. Dambreville *

I.

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Supreme Court has long adhered to a federal policy favoring arbitration, and
has consistently resolved ambiguities within arbitration clauses in favor of arbitration. 1 In
applying this principle, courts are guided by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 2 which provides
the federal substantive law of arbitrability. 3 The Court has now consistently interpreted the
FAA’s main purpose as to guarantee that arbitration agreements are enforced according to their
terms. 4 Yet, in regards to procedural matters of arbitrability there is a presumption that these
matters should be decided by the court, unless otherwise stated in the arbitral agreement. 5 But
where parties devise broad reaching arbitration agreements, we have seen the court determine that
the arbitrator, not the court, is better equipped to decide arbitrability. 6 Likewise, where a choiceof-law provision introduces ambiguity into the arbitration agreement, the court has determined
that the arbitrator, and not the court, shall decide procedural arbitration matters. 7 The court’s
deference to arbitrators on matters concerning choice-of-law provisions in opposition to
arbitration has traditionally been based on ambiguous language found within a given provision.
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1
See Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Standard Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989) (“[D]ue regard
must be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration, and ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself
resolved in favor of arbitration.”).
2
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006).
3

See Bechtel Do Brasil Construções Ltda. v. UEG AraucÁria Ltda., 638 F.3d 150, 154 (2d Cir. 2011); see also
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (“We are guided by the ‘federal
substantive law of arbitrability’ created by the Federal Arbitration Act.”).
4
See Volt, 489 U.S. at 479 (“The FAA’s primary purpose of ensuring that private agreements to arbitrate are
enforced according to their terms.”); see also CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012) ("Section 2 of
the FAA . . . requires that courts enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms."); see also Rent-A-Ctr., W.,
Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2777 (2010) (explaining that the FAA places arbitration agreements on the same level
as other contracts and mandates that courts enforce the agreements in accordance to their terms).
5
See First Options v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 939 (1995) (noting that if there is “clear and unmistakable” evidence
that the parties intended the issue of arbitrability to be decided by the arbitrator then the issue is in the jurisdiction of
the arbitrator).
6
See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002); see also John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston,
376 U.S. 543, 557 (1964) (“Thus, ‘procedural questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition’
are presumptively not for the judge, but for anaarbitrator, to decide.”).
7
See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52, 62 (1995); see also Volt, 489 U.S. at 476
(concluding that in light of the federal policy favoring arbitration, ambiguities relating to the scope of the agreement
should be resolved in favor of arbitration).
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This suggests that in circumstances where parties’ expressly, clearly, and specifically agree to
have a particular law govern the arbitration procedure courts shall enforce the agreement, so long
as it does not create ambiguity. Yet, courts have failed to provide guidance as to the level of
clarity required to enforce an agreement whose provisions are opposition to arbitration.
Part I of this article will focus on the Second Circuit’s recent expansion of the FAA,
specifically its determination that ancillary state-laws governing procedural arbitration, including
issues of timeliness, are preempted by the FAA. 8 By analyzing the Second Circuit’s most recent
decision in Bechtel v. UEGA, we will address the enhanced preemptive power of the FAA and
shed light on serious concerns regarding the level of specific language required within the
arbitration clause to ensure the enforcement of provisions written in opposition to arbitration.
Part II focuses on the Supreme Court’s historical treatment of procedural arbitrability and
illustrates its development from Volt Information Sciences 9 to Mastrobuono and Howsam.
Ultimately, the Court’s opinion in Howsam—which held that it is the arbitrator, and not the court,
who rules on procedural issues such as whether a claim is time-barred—is shown to lead to a
number of unresolved questions for the court. Part III examines the Second Circuit’s most recent
handling of procedural arbitrability issues, such as time limitations, and the disabling effect that
the Bechtel holding has had on ancillary state laws of arbitration procedure. By effectively
rendering ancillary state laws on arbitration inapplicable, the FAA has essentially become the
absolute preemptive procedural law of arbitration within the Second Circuit. Under this theory,
parties are virtually unable to contractually assign issues of procedural arbitrability to the courts.
Finally, I conclude that the Bechtel court correctly decided the issue and the subsequent
effects will be beneficial to process of arbitration. The court’s decision will have the effect of
providing predictability to future parties of arbitration; it will also accord greater jurisdiction of
arbitration issues to arbitrators; and, it will maintain the FAA’s intended virtues of efficiency,
cost effectiveness, and expeditiousness.

II.

EVOLUTION OF PROCEDURAL ARBITRABILITY

A. Desperate Times: The Growth and Application of Contract Freedom in
Arbitration
Section 2 of the FAA provides legal validity to the arbitral process and justifies
agreements to arbitrate as lawful under the parties’ freedom of contract rights. 10 In Volt
Information Sciences v. Board of Trustees of Leland Standard Junior University, the Supreme
Court first highlighted and emphasized the importance of contract freedom to the enforcement of

8
9

See Bechtel, 638 F.3d at 154.
See Volt, 489 U.S. at 468.

10

9 U.S.C. § 2 (“A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to
perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy
arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”); see also Dean Witter v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213,
221 (1985); see also Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp, 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1774–75 (2010).
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arbitration contracts.11 The Volt court found that where the parties’ contractual intent was clearly
to have state law govern the arbitration, the state law was capable of invalidating the agreement to
arbitrate. 12 The Court reasoned that section 4 of the FAA restricts the power of the courts by
mandating them to compel arbitration, but must do so in the manner directed by the parties’
agreement. 13 Pursuant to Volt, the parties are the masters of their arbitration agreement, and
therefore they can decide which state laws will govern the arbitration process. Accordingly, we
see the need for judicial oversight and interpretation in determining the parties’ contractual intent.
The need for judicial inclusion when deciding threshold matters of arbitrability seems to work
against the FAA’s essential benefits of efficient, expeditious, and inexpensive dispute resolution.
Given these drawbacks, the Volt doctrine seems to have caustic limitations in practice.
Consequently, subsequent cases have added qualifications and at times even contradicted the
reasoning and decision in Volt. 14
The Court explained, with greater clarity, the role of contract freedom in arbitration in
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan. 15 In its decision, the Court declared the express
language within the arbitration contract as the true source of final authority on matters of
arbitrability. 16 In sum, under Kaplan, the court only enforces the rules created and agreed upon by
the parties on issues submitted for arbitration, in accordance to the terms of the arbitration
agreement. 17 In Kaplan, the arbitral contract’s choice of law provision only governed issues,
whereas in Volt the state law seemed to govern all related arbitration disputes. Kaplan generally
continues to be applied by the Court. And yet, where a doubt as to the scope of the arbitration
contract arises, the Court has consistently resolved the issue in favor of arbitration. 18 Again, the
required inclusion of the judiciary in deciding the scope of arbitration seems to work in direct
opposition of the essential benefits of the FAA. 19

11

See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE 233
(Thomson/West 2007).
12
See Volt, 489 U.S. at 479 (“Where, as here, the parties have agreed to abide by state rules of arbitration,
enforcing those rules according to the terms of the agreement is fully consistent with the goals of the FAA, even if the
result is that arbitration is stayed where the Act would otherwise permit it to go forward.”).
13
See id. at 474–75 (“But § 4 of the FAA does not confer a right to compel arbitration of any dispute at any time;
it confers only the right to obtain an order directing that ‘arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in [the
parties’] agreement.’”) (emphasis added).
14
See, e.g., Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 940–49.
15

See id. at 938.

16

See id. at 944 (“Courts should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is ‘clea[r]
and unmistakabl[e]’ evidence that they did so.”).
17
See id. at 947.
18

See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452 (2003); see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 626–27 (1985) (explaining that we are beyond the time “when judicial suspicion of
the desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals” could restrict arbitration. The court found that
it was required to “rigorously enforce” arbitration agreements).
19
Benefits such as cost effectiveness, efficiency, and less time consuming.
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B.

Time for Change: The Mastrobuono Effect on Procedural Arbitration Law

The subject of state law governing arbitrability was revisited and again redefined in the
1995 Supreme Court decision of Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton. 20 In Mastrobuono,
the issue was “whether a choice-of-law provision may preclude an arbitration award of punitive
damages that would otherwise be proper.” 21 In other words, the question for the Court was
whether the arbitral tribunal could award Mastrobuono punitive damages despite the agreed upon
governing state law that prohibited arbitrators from awarding punitive damages. 22
The Court ruled in Mastrobuono that the state law could not preclude the arbitral tribunal
from awarding punitive damages. 23 The Court reasoned that neither the choice-of-law provision
nor the arbitration award expressed an intention to prohibit the award of punitive damages,
therefore the state law, at most, only introduced ambiguity into the arbitration agreement.24 Here,
we see the court determine that the act of simply choosing a governing law by party does not
express the parties’ intent to have a limiting rule enforced against arbitration.25 The Mastrobuono
court further noted that based on the federal policy favoring of arbitration, if an arbitration
agreement is ambiguous, the ambiguities must be resolved in support of arbitration.26 The
manipulation and construction of the judicial line of reasoning in this case seems to suggest a
motive by the court to compel and enforce arbitration by any available means.
Moreover, despite its affirmation that the purpose of the implementation of the FAA was
to enforce arbitration agreements as written,27 the Mastrobuono court again qualifies and,
arguably, contradicts the doctrine in Volt by providing for a “party intent” evaluation. This
evaluation takes into account what the parties would have reasonably intended to happen, as
defined by the Court. This aspect of the decision is confusing and although Justice Stevens relied
on language from Volt to sustain the Court’s interpretation of the FAA, he concludes that the case
boils down to what the contract specifically says about punitive damages. 28 In doing so, the court
sets the specificity requirement of terms extremely high within the arbitration clause. In addition,
the Mastrobuono court decides that contractual silence on a specific issue must be resolved in
favor of arbitration. 29 Hence, under this doctrine, the parties must be extremely specific as to the
agreed upon limitations on arbitration and they must unambiguously state their intentions within
the arbitration clause.
In effect, the court suggests that, after Mastrobuono, the parties’ choice of state law will
be enforced only when it supports the recourse to arbitration or when the parties have expressly
recognized and agreed that the state law contains a restriction to the right to arbitrate that is
applicable to their agreement.30 This approach to procedural arbitrability seems to almost always

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

See Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 52.
See id. at 55.
See id.
See id. at 65.
See id. at 62.
See id.
See id.; see also Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S at 24.
See CARBONNEAU, supra note 11, at 233.
See Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 58.
See id. at 62.
See CARBONNEAU, supra note 11, at 233.
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inevitably resolve disputes in favor of arbitration. The Mastrobuono doctrine sets an unrealistic
and unattainable standard for parties seeking procedural limitations on arbitration. Since it is very
unlikely that parties could actually and accurately express the potentially infinite limitations to
arbitration that they may intend to have enforced. This decision begs the question—how specific
is specific enough?

C. So Little Time: Howsam and the Timeliness Issue
The issue of whether time limitations on arbitration are questions of arbitrability for the
court to decide arose in Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 31 a 2002 Supreme Court case. In
Howsam, the parties’ choice of law had a time limitation rule that prohibited the invocation of
arbitration on claims brought more than six years from the dispute.32 The Court granted certiorari
to the Tenth Circuit decision that held that the time limitation rule raised an issue about the
dispute’s arbitrability, which should only be resolved by the court and not by the arbitrator. 33
As expected, the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit’s decision. 34 Justice Breyer
delivered the opinion for the Court, affirming that the time limitation rule raised a question of
arbitrability, however he disagreed with the assertion that arbitrability questions were only for the
court to decide.35 He explained that the question of arbitrability is for the court to decide where
the parties have not clearly provided otherwise. 36 We see here that parties can defer jurisdiction to
the arbitrators on matters of arbitrability if they unambiguously state their intent within the
arbitration clause.
Yet, the Howsam court also determines that in general circumstances (for example,
procedural questions growing out of the dispute) where parties would likely expect the arbitrator
to decide the matter, presumptively the arbitrator, not the court, would decide the matter.37
Interestingly, the court provides a carve-out to its rule by creating an exception based on party
expectation. The court goes further by concluding that parties’ expect threshold matters of
procedure to be decided by arbitrators.38 It is unclear how the court came to this conclusion,
however it cites the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act of 2000 (RUAA), which states that an
“arbitrator shall decide whether a condition precedent to arbitrability has been fulfilled,” 39 as the
basis for the exception. 40
The outcome of this decision has been that, after Howsam, procedural questions on
gateway issues (e.g. time limitations) are presumed not to be for the court, but within the
31
32
33
34
35

Howsam, 537 U.S. at 79.
Id. at 82.
Id.
See id. at 86.
See id.

36

See id. at 83 (quoting AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)) (“The
question whether the parties have submitted a particular dispute to arbitration, i.e., the ‘question of arbitrability,’ is ‘an
issue for judicial determination [u]nless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise.’”) (emphasis added).
37
See id. at 84.
38

See id.; see also Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S at 24–25 (“[T]he presumption is that the arbitrator should decide
‘allegations of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.’”).
39
RUAA § 6(c) cmt. 2, (2000).
40

See Howsam, 537 U.S. at 85.
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arbitrators’ jurisdiction. 41 In other words, the court presumes that threshold issues of arbitration
should be resolved by the arbitrator. Yet, this decision does not go so far as to expressly mandate
procedural arbitrability jurisdiction to the arbitrator. The question still remains: whether parties
can defer jurisdiction of procedural matters to the court when there is clear and unmistakable
intent to do so, as stated in the arbitration clause. If the answer is yes, then how can parties
actually accomplish this result?

III.

BECHTEL’S DECISION ON PROCEDURAL ARBITRABILITY AND ITS
E F F E C T O N A N C I L L A R Y S T A T E L A WS

A. Time Management: Bechtel Do Brasil Construções Ltda. v. UEG AraucÁria
Ltda.
The Second Circuit recently had the opportunity to test the limits of Howsam regarding
time limitation rules that preclude arbitration, in Bechtel Do Brasil Construções Ltda. v. UEG
AraucÁria Ltda. 42 The issue in Bechtel involved the arbitrability of the statute of limitations
defense. At issue were the conflicting terms contained in the arbitration clause. The agreement
first states, “[a]ny dispute, controversy, or claim arising out of or relating to the Contract, or the
breach, termination or validity thereof…shall be finally settled by arbitration,” 43 and also
includes a choice-of-law provision that specified that the procedure and administration of
arbitration would be governed by New York Civil Practice Law. 44 Section 7502(b) of the New
York Civil Practice Law states:
If, at the time that a demand for arbitration was made or notice of
intention to arbitrate was served, the claim sought to be arbitrated
would have been barred by limitation of time had it been asserted in
court of the state, a party may assert the limitation as a bar to the
arbitration on an application to the court…. 45

The District Court for the Southern District of New York found that the language of the
contract showed “the parties’ clear intent to select New York law for arbitration procedure”,
which includes limiting the arbitrators’ power to adjudicate preliminary questions of timeliness.46
Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that,
although the matter was a close one, the timeliness of a party’s claims is a question for the
41

See CARBONNEAU, supra note 11, at 274 (“Therefore, ‘procedural questions which grow out of the dispute and
bear on its final disposition are presumptively not for the judge, but for an arbitrator to decide.’”).
42
See Bechtel, 638 F.3d at 150.
43

See id. at 154 (“Any dispute, controversy, or claim arising out of or relating to the Contract, or the breach,
termination or validity thereof … shall be finally settled by arbitration in accordance with the Rules of Conciliation and
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce … except as these rules may be modified herein.”) (emphasis
added).
44
See id. (“[T]he validity, effect, and interpretation of this agreement to arbitrate shall be governed by the laws of
the State of New York,’ and ‘[t]he law governing the procedure and administration of any arbitration instituted
pursuant to Clause 37 is the law of the State of New York.’”).
45
See id. at 153.
46

See id.
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arbitrator, not the court. 47 The rationale for the court’s decision was that, despite the contract’s
language indicating New York law as governing the arbitral procedure, the contract does not
specifically mention timeliness disputes or a right of parties to resort to the courts.48

B.

Running Out of Time: Bechtel’s Furtherance of the Judiciary’s Agenda on
Arbitration

As illustrated by the Mastorbuono, Howsam, and countless other decisions, the Supreme
Court has shown an almost impervious desire to compel arbitration and defer to the competence
of arbitrators to rule over parties’ claims. And to further these goals the Court seems to be less
inclined to follow precedential reasoning for the sake of achieving a consistent end-result—
compelling arbitration. The Second Circuit’s holding in Bechtel befittingly abides by the Supreme
Court’s precedents. In Bechtel, the court compelled arbitration despite the parties’ agreement to
have arbitral procedures governed by a state-law—which explicitly permitted parties to assert
statute of limitations grounds for barring arbitration on an application to the court. 49
Despite the terms of the chosen state-law, the Second Circuit held that the arbitrator
should decide the statute of limitations issue. On its face, this decision seems to go against
established precedent insofar as the court seems unwilling to enforce the express terms of parties’
agreement. However, the Bechtel court heavily relies upon the concept of specificity within
contractual terms, as introduced and emphasized in Mastorbuono. 50 The court required parties to
explicitly show that the arbitration clause contained specific language that indicated an intention
to have the state limitation rule enforced. 51 And yet, the arbitration clause in Bechtel, seemingly,
did contain the requisite language. The arbitration clause specifically named and declared the
state law as “[t]he law governing the procedure and administration of … arbitration.”52 By
agreeing to have New York law govern the arbitration procedure, it logically follows that the
parties’ intended to be bound by New York’s law on arbitration procedure. Despite the parties’
expressed intent, the Bechtel court found that the issue of procedural arbitrability was not
governed by state law.
Unfortunately, the question of whether parties can defer jurisdiction of procedural matters
to the court remains unclear. The Bechtel court has not only presumed that the arbitrator has
jurisdiction as prescribed by Howsam, 53 but has, in effect, mandated jurisdiction to the arbitrator,
in spite of the parties’ agreement. This ruling clearly illustrates the continued effort by the courts
to defeat laws which serve as obstacles to arbitration.

47
48
49

See id. at 154.
See id. at 156.
See id. at 153.

50

See Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 62 (noting that under the common-law parties can not benefit from the doubt
created by ambiguous language within a contract; for the court to enforce language against the interest of the parties’
that drafted it, the contract must be unambiguous).
51
See Bechtel, 638 F.3d at 155.
52

See id. at 154.

53

See Howsam, 537 U.S. at 85 (explaining that the condition precedent to arbitrability should be decided by the
arbitrator).
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1.

The Court’s Effect on Ancillary State Laws to the Arbitration
Agreement

There are two possible explanations for the Bechtel court’s decision. One explanation is
that the court has decided that rules in opposition to arbitration will only be enforced where
parties’ specifically state the rule within the terms of the arbitration contract. This plausible
explanation adheres to the Kaplan doctrine 54 insofar as the arbitration clause is considered the
final, and likely the only, authority on matters of arbitrability. Under this interpretation however,
state laws on arbitration procedure that are ancillary to the agreement are only applicable where
the court deems it appropriate. In other words, it is at the court’s discretion to apply ancillary state
laws where they are found to favor to arbitration. This sort of pick-and-choose approach by the
courts was first introduced by Mastrobuono, 55 and it completely undermines the parties’
agreement and, consequentially, violates the parties’ freedom of contract rights. Courts are
expected to provide the legal community with uniformity and predictability in their rulings, yet
this approach accomplishes neither.
Another explanation is that state laws on arbitration procedure are completely
inapplicable and will not be adhered to or enforced by the court. Under this approach, parties are
completely incapable of deferring issues of arbitrability to the court by way of state laws because
the arbitration clause and the FAA are the only governing laws of procedure. Though the Bechtel
court does not expressly state this as their approach, this seems to be the current position of the
court. By rendering ancillary state laws on arbitration procedure inapplicable to the judiciary, the
court has left parties incapable of choosing an alternative form of procedural law to govern
arbitration. Following this line of reasoning, the Bechtel court expands the FAA’s reach and
application in regards to issues of procedural arbitrability, because its’ decision effectively makes
the FAA the absolute preemptive procedural law of arbitration in the Second Circuit.
In effect, after Bechtel, parties are virtually unable to defer jurisdiction on issues of
procedural arbitrability to the courts because of the unenforceability of ancillary state laws and
highly impractical burden of stating every enforceable limiting rule within the arbitral clause.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Despite a contract clearly stating the parties’ intent to have a state law govern the
arbitration procedure, the Second Circuit court will ultimately compel arbitration whether or not it
violates state law. After Bechtel, if the arbitration agreement does not, itself, contain a clear
statement in regards to the statute of limitations being withheld from the arbitrator, the FAA will
defeat any ancillary state law on timeliness, notwithstanding an agreement to have the state law
govern the procedure and administration of the arbitration. Without specifically expressing the
disabling rule in the arbitral clause, the procedural arbitration issues will proceed to the arbitrator.
Essentially, the Bechtel court expands Mastrobuono‘s ruling by determining that the FAA
preempts ancillary state laws despite party intent. The Mastrobuono court sought to enforce what
it thought the parties’ intended to convey within the arbitration contract, as to prevent a party

54

See Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 944.

55

See CARBONNEAU, supra note 11, at 233 (“[A]fter Mastrobuono, party choice as to state law will be fully
respected only when the choice-of-law fosters the recourse to arbitration….”).
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from being penalized by an unfavorable rule. However, the Bechtel court compelled arbitration in
accordance with the FAA despite the parties’ intent not to have the FAA apply. Although the
Second Circuit’s decision can be criticized as not enforcing the terms stated within the arbitration
agreement, the court has a very good reason for deciding in this fashion.
In conclusion, the Second Circuit’s decision was correct because it provides predictability
insofar as future parties to arbitration will not expect state laws on arbitral procedure—that are
ancillary to the agreement—to be enforced. Second, this decision accords greater jurisdiction of
arbitration matters to the arbitrator. As a result, courts will be alleviated from adjudicating on
threshold procedural arbitrability issues that involve state laws. Lastly, the effect of the Bechtel
decision is that the arbitration process will be more efficiency, less costly, and more expeditious;
fulfilling the intended virtues of the FAA.
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